There are several standards of proof in use across the world. 1 Employing public, clearly understood standards of proof serves a range of functions, including bolstering citizens' trust in the system and protecting individuals from undue loss of liberty. Before the state may perform these actions they must determine, to that confidence level, certain facts to be the case. Standards of proof are levels of confidence required to perform these actions legitimately. They might stop and search an individual, charge him with a crime, incarcerate him, impose a restraining order or curfew, remove child custody rights, or order him to pay costs or fees, such as child support. The Standard of Proof The state sometimes performs actions against the wishes or interests of individual citizens. I conclude by suggesting that the inadequacies of Laudan's reasoning might be good news for consequence-based justifications of the standard of proof. I conclude that, even if consequences determine the appropriate standard of proof, Laudan's arguments fail to show the standard is too high. I also explain why his formula is mistaken, and illuminate consequences Laudan neglects. In this paper I outline various ways Laudan's uses of crime statistics are flawed, and explain how he substantially overestimates risks of victimhood and underestimates costs of false convictions. He presents a formula for calculating the preferred standard. He argues that since the former risk is higher, and the aggregate harms are worse, the standard of proof should be substantially lowered. In this spirit, Laudan uses crime statistics to estimate risks the average citizen runs of being violently victimised and falsely convicted. But what legitimates this standard, rather than an alternative? One view holds the standard of proof should be determined or justified-at least in large part-by its consequences. The most widely-used and important standard of proof for criminal conviction is the " beyond a reasonable doubt " standard. In criminal trials the state must establish, to a particular standard of proof, the defendant's guilt. The resulting balance supports a standard arguably in the ballpark of the customary understanding of BARD: a standard requiring that the fact finder have a high, though not maximally high, degree of confidence that the defendant is guilty. In this paper, I offer a new retributive justification that supports excluding the instrumental benefits of punishment from the balance that sets the standard. Meanwhile, consequentialist arguments plausibly support a substantially lower standard - in some cases so low as to undermine the idea that punishment is what is at stake. A number of non-consequentialist justifications that aim to support an even higher standard have been offered all are morally unsound. Strikingly, no good reason has yet been offered in defense of using that standard. It is customary to describe it, when putting a number on it, as requiring that the fact finder be at least 90% certain, after considering the evidence, that the defendant is guilty. What standard(s) of proof is/are required in Halacha with regards to Beis Din cases? My impression (which is vague) is that clear and convincing would be a pretty close approximation, but I'm not sure.The standard of proof in criminal trials in many liberal democracies is proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the BARD standard. One famous distinction between capital cases and others is if it requires seeing vs knowing (עדי ראיה ולא עדי ידעה), but that is a standards of evidence issue, not a standard of proof. What are the relevant standards of proof in Judaism and when to they apply? In a Jewish context, I think the last four (Preponderance, clear and convincing, beyond a reasonable doubt and shadow of a doubt) are a reasonable description of the perception of G-d in the four worlds, however this question is about Choshen Mishpat. Beyond a reasonable doubt (one would be willing to rely and act upon it without hesitation in the most important of one's own affairs).īeyond a shadow of a doubt is, of course, even higher than this, although not used in English law (and some of a philosophical bent would question if it is ever achievable).Clear and convincing (substantially more than 51% and a firm belief or conviction of the judge).Preponderance of evidence (51%, or more likely than not).Probable cause (30-51% chance of the relevant fact).That type of term is very popular from an English Law perspective, which has varying standards of "proof". This answer suggests a standard of "beyond a shadow of a doubt".
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